I. INTRODUCTION
In Eurocrypt 2003, Gentry [1] introduced the notion of certificate-based encryption (CBE). The main advantage of certificate-based encryption can be used to construct an efficient public-key infrastructure (PKI), solves certificate revocation problem and eliminate third-party queries in the traditional PKI. In addition, it also solves the inherent key escrow problem in the identity-based cryptography [2] , [3] . The certificate-based encryption and signature have attracted a lot of attention since it is proposed. Yum and Lee [7] revisited the definitions and security notions of certificateless encryption (CL-PKE) and certificate-based encryption. They provided a formal equivalence theorem among identity-based encryption, certificateless encryption and certificate-based encryption. Galindo et al. [10] pointed out that a dishonest authority could break the security of the three generic constructions of CBE and CL-PKE schemes given in [7] , [8] . These constructions were inherently flawed due to a naive use of double encryption as highlighted in [9] . Al-Riyami and Paterson [4] gave an analysis of Gentry's CBE concept and repaired a number of problems with the original definition and security model for CBE. They also provided a generic conversion showing that a secure CBE scheme could be constructed from any secure CL-PKE scheme. Kang and Park [6] pointed out that their conversion was incorrect due to the flaw in their security proof. This implies that the concrete CBE scheme by Al-Riyami and Paterson is therefore invalid. Recently, Lu et al [11] investigated the generic security of the CBE scheme obtained by applying the FO conversion to an arbitrary underlying OW-CBE-CPA secure CBE scheme and confirm that the FO conversion can generically convert any OW-CBE-CPA secure CBE into an IND-CBE-CCA secure CBE. They also note that the straightforward application of the FO conversion only leads to a CBE scheme with a loose reduction. They solved this problem by providing two security-enhancing conversions and achieved two generic CBE constructions [12] , [13] from PKE and IBE, which are provably CCAsecure in the random oracle model. Lu et al [14] constructed an efficient CBE scheme with paring and prove it to be CCA-secure in the random oracle model based on the hardness of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem. In parallel to CBE, Kang, Park and Hahn [5] proposed the security notion of certificate-based signature (CBS) that follows the idea of CBE presented by Gentry [1] . At the same time, they showed an application of CBS to proxy signatures [15] , [16] . Li et al. [17] first introduced key replacement attack into the certificate-based system and refined the security model of certificate-based signature. They showed that the certificate-based signature scheme presented by Kang, Park and Hahn [5] was insecure against key replacement attacks. Furthermore they proposed a new secure and efficient certificate-based signature scheme, which was shown to be existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks under the computational DiffieHellman assumption in the random oracle model. Au et al. [18] proposed a certificate-based (linkable) ring signature, which solved the problem of the complicated certificate chain verification in traditional PKI. Shao [20] presented a certificate-based verifiably encrypted signature from pairings and proved the new scheme was EUF-CMA secure in a stronger security model. Recently, Liu et al. [19] proposed two new certificate-based signature schemes with new features and advantages. The first one does not require any pairing computation, which is very efficient and its security can be proven using discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model. Another scheme can be proven secure in the standard model. Proxy signature is an important primitive to ensure the service availability issue. The concept of proxy signatures was first introduced by Mambo et al. [23] in 1996. A proxy signature scheme allows an entity to delegate signing capability to another entity in such a way that the latter can sign messages on behalf of the former when the former is not available. From a proxy signature, anyone can check both the original signer's delegation and the proxy signer's digital signature. Boldyreva et al. [24] formalized a notion of security for proxy signatures and showed that secure proxy signature schemes could be derived from secure standard signature schemes. Huang et al. [25] further refined the security model of the proxy signature and proposed some secure and efficient proxy signature schemes. Proxy signature schemes have attracted a considerable amount of interest from the cryptographic research community and have gained some research achievement [15, 16, 25, 26] .
In the paper, we first propose the formal definition and security model of certificate-based proxy signature. We then show that the certificate-based proxy signature scheme in [5] is insecure against key replacement attack. We further propose two certificate-based proxy signature schemes, analyze performance and the proposed schemes are proved secure in the random oracle model.
In the rest of the paper, it is organized as follows. In the next section, we review some preliminaries required in this paper. We describe the definition and security model of CBPS in Section III. In Section IV, we point out that CBPS scheme in [5] is insecure against key replacement attack. We propose two provably secure CBPS schemes and provide the security proof in Section V. In Section VI, we present a discussion on computation and communication efficiency. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the knowledge about the bilinear pairing and computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem.
Bilinear Pairing: Let G 1 denote an additive group of prime order p and 2 G be a multiplicative group of the same order. Let P be a generator of 
• The map e is non-degenerate:
• The map e is efficiently computable. ( , ) m σ is valid. Otherwise, outputs false. In DelegationCertificateGen algorithm, we regard the original signer as semi-trusted third party and integrate delegation algorithm of proxy signature and certificate generation algorithm of CBS into one Delegation CertificateGen algorithm, which makes CBPS scheme more efficient. The certificate generates by Delegation CertificateGen algorithm, that is, a short signature plays threefold role, firstly acts as the binding the public key of proxy signer and its holder, secondly acts as a partial signature key, and thirdly acts as delegation information about the warrant of proxy signer. We can use short signature algorithm [21, 22] to the above goal.
B. Security Models of CBPS
The first security model of proxy signature was proposed in [24] . Huang et al. [25, 26] further refined the security model of the proxy signature, which they divide the potential attackers into three kinds. Li et al. [17] first introduced key replacement attack into the certificatebased system and refined the security model of certificate-based signature. In this subsection, we follow the main idea in [17, [24] [25] [26] and divide the potential attackers into the following two kinds in essence. has not been requested as one of the ProxySign queries. Compared with the security model defined in [5, [24] [25] [26] , an important refinement is that we allow the I A to replace the target proxy signer's public key with any value chosen by him which captures the essence of the adversaries in the CBPS. However, I A cannot obtain the delegation of the warrant and the certificate of the proxy signer's public key. In addition, we allow I A to corrupt any proxy signer (except target proxy signer) in the system which is in order to reflect the malicious user who tries to only use his own secret key (without the knowledge of certificate and delegation) to generate valid signatures. The success probability of adaptively chosen message and chosen identity adversary I A wins the above games is defined as IV. KEY REPLACEMENT ATTACK FOR CBPS SCHEME Kang et al. [5] proposed a CBPS scheme and claimed that their scheme is secure under the security notion defined in [24] . We point out that their scheme is insecure against key replacement attack. In order to facilitate analysis,we first review the proxy signature scheme in [5] .
A. Review of CBPS Scheme
We follow the denotations in [5] . Assume that there are two participants, Charlie and Alice with secret and public key pairs ( , ) 
B. A Concrete Key Replacement Attack
We will show that the proxy scheme above is insecure against key replacement attack. The attack method is as follows.
The adversary first chooses a random value In this section, we propose two provably secure certificate-based proxy signature schemes: one is denoted as the CBPSm proxy signature scheme, the other is denoted as CBPSa proxy signature scheme.
A. CBPSm Proxy Signature Scheme
In this subsection, we propose a provably secure proxy signature scheme. The proxy signature scheme is as follows:
1. where the value of δ will be determined later. 
In addition, all the simulation can be done in polynomial time.
From the simulation, we have 
C. CBPSa Proxy Signature Scheme
In this subsection, we propose a provably secure proxy signature scheme, which is based on the CBSa in [5] .
( , ) ( As shown in the table, CBSPm proxy signature scheme enjoys the same signature length and computation cost as the scheme in [5] . CBPSa proxy signature scheme consists of 3 elements in 1 G and is about 170 bits longer than the proxy scheme in [5] when some suitable elliptic curve is used as the underlying building block. CBPSa proxy signature scheme also requires more operation cost than the proxy scheme in [5] .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the definition and security model of certificate-based proxy signature. Our analysis showed that CBPS scheme proposed by Kang, Park and Hahn is insecure against the key replacement attack. Furthermore, we constructed two certificate-based proxy signature schemes. Our proposal is proven existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks in the random oracle model. The security depends on merely well known computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Compared with the certificate-based proxy signature scheme in [5] , CBPSm scheme enjoys the same signature length and computation cost, while CBPSa scheme is not as efficient as the scheme in [5] . Due to a merit of CBS, our CBPS scheme does not require a secure channel for proxy designation.
